Development and validation of the Autonomy Scale Amsterdam.

This paper describes the development and validation of the Autonomy Scale Amsterdam (ASA). We propose that a new measure of autonomy is needed and, as such, we developed and validated an autonomy scale relevant for psychiatry. Based on literature, an expert meeting and three samples of the general population (N = 298, N = 207, N = 309) we provide evidence (a) that supports a 6-factor structure model as a better fit than alternative models with a high reliability to capture the concept of autonomy consisting of: Self-integration, Engagement with life, Goal-directedness, Self-control, External constraints and Social support, (b) for the scale's convergent and discriminant validity with constructs in autonomy's nomological network and (c) for the scale's criterion validity with well-established well-being outcomes, and (d) that the measure is not redundant with a prior measure of autonomy, the autonomy-connectedness scale, and demonstrates incremental validity in the prediction of mental health over and above an existing measure of autonomy. Taken together, the results suggest that the ASA is a useful scale that shows positive evidence of psychometric quality to measure autonomy in a sample of the general population (total N = 856), accounting for a unique predictive value over and above an existing measure of autonomy concerning several mental health outcomes. The ASA can further help our understanding of the role of autonomy in mental disorders.

Learning and metacognition under volatility in GD: Lower learning rates and distorted coupling between action and confidence.

Background and aims: Decisions and learning processes are under metacognitive control, where confidence in one's actions guides future behaviour. Indeed, studies have shown that being more confident results in less action updating and learning, and vice versa. This coupling between action and confidence can be disrupted, as has been found in individuals with high compulsivity symptoms. Patients with Gambling Disorder (GD) have been shown to exhibit both higher confidence and deficits in learning. Methods: In this study, we tested the hypotheses that patients with GD display increased confidence, reduced action updating and lower learning rates. Additionally, we investigated whether the action-confidence coupling was distorted in patients with GD. To address this, 27 patients with GD and 30 control participants performed a predictive inference task designed to assess action and confidence dynamics during learning under volatility. Action-updating, confidence and their coupling were assessed and computational modeling estimated parameters for learning rates, error sensitivity, and sensitivity to environmental changes. Results: Contrary to our expectations, results revealed no significant group differences in action updating or confidence levels. Nevertheless, GD patients exhibited a weakened coupling between confidence and action, as well as lower learning rates. Discussion and conclusions: This suggests that patients with GD may underutilize confidence when steering future behavioral choices. Ultimately, these findings point to a disruption of metacognitive control in GD, without a general overconfidence bias in neutral, non-incentivized volatile learning contexts.

Confidence and risky decision-making in gambling disorder.

Background and aims: People with Gambling Disorder (GD) often make risky decisions and experience cognitive distortions about gambling. Moreover, people with GD have been shown to be overly confident in their decisions, especially when money can be won. Here we investigated if and how the act of making a risky choice with varying monetary stakes impacts confidence differently in patients with GD (n = 27) relative to healthy controls (HCs) (n = 30). Methods: We used data from our previous mixed-gamble study, in which participants were given the choice of a certain option or a 50/50 gamble with potential gains or losses, after which they rated their confidence. Results: While HCs were more confident when making certain than risky choices, GD patients were specifically more confident when making risky choices than certain choices. Notably, relative to HCs, confidence of patients with GD decreased more strongly with higher gain values when making a certain choice, suggesting a stronger fear of missing out or "anticipated regret" of missing out on potential gains when rejecting the risky choice. Discussion: The current findings highlight the potential relevance of confidence and "regret" as cognitive mechanisms feeding into excessive risk-taking as seen in GD. Moreover, this study adds to the limited previous work investigating how confidence is affected in value-based risky contexts.

Differences in metacognitive functioning between obsessive-compulsive disorder patients and highly compulsive individuals from the general population.

BACKGROUND: Our confidence, a form of metacognition, guides our behavior. Confidence abnormalities have been found in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). A first notion based on clinical case-control studies suggests lower confidence in OCD patients compared to healthy controls. Contrarily, studies in highly compulsive individuals from general population samples showed that obsessive-compulsive symptoms related positively or not at all to confidence. A second notion suggests that an impairment in confidence estimation and usage is related to compulsive behavior, which is more often supported by studies in general population samples. These opposite findings call into question whether findings from highly compulsive individuals from the general population are generalizable to OCD patient populations. METHODS: To test this, we investigated confidence at three hierarchical levels: local confidence in single decisions, global confidence in task performance and higher-order self-beliefs in 40 OCD patients (medication-free, no comorbid diagnoses), 40 controls, and 40 matched highly compulsive individuals from the general population (HComp). RESULTS: In line with the first notion we found that OCD patients exhibited relative underconfidence at all three hierarchical levels. In contrast, HComp individuals showed local and global overconfidence and worsened metacognitive sensitivity compared with OCD patients, in line with the second notion. CONCLUSIONS: Metacognitive functioning observed in a general highly compulsive population, often used as an analog for OCD, is distinct from that in a clinical OCD population, suggesting that OC symptoms in these two groups relate differently to (meta)cognitive processes. These findings call for caution in generalizing (meta)cognitive findings from general population to clinical samples.

Effects of 10 add-on HF-rTMS treatment sessions on alcohol use and craving among detoxified inpatients with alcohol use disorder: a randomized sham-controlled clinical trial.

BACKGROUND AND AIMS: Alcohol use disorder (AUD) is a chronic disorder with high relapse rates. There are currently few clinical trials of high frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (HF-rTMS) to reduce alcohol use among AUD patients, and results are mixed. The current study tested the effect of 10 add-on sessions of HF-rTMS over the right dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC) on alcohol use and craving. DESIGN: Single-center, single blind sham-controlled parallel-group RCT (n = 80), with 3 and 6 months follow-up. SETTING: Clinical treatment center in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. PARTICIPANTS: Eighty detoxified and abstinent AUD inpatients in clinical treatment (20 females, average age = 44.35 years). INTERVENTION: Ten sessions of active or sham HF-rTMS (60 10 Hz trains of 5 sec at 110% motor threshold) over the right DLPFC on 10 consecutive work-days. MEASUREMENTS: The primary outcome measure is the number of abstinent days over 6-month follow-up (FU). Secondary outcome measures are craving over 6-month FU (alcohol urge questionnaire and obsessive-compulsive drinking scale), time to first relapse over 6-month FU and grams of alcohol consumed over 6-month FU. Additional outcome measures: full abstinence over 6-month FU and treatment success over 12-month FU. FINDINGS: HF-rTMS did not affect the number of abstinent days over 6 months FU [sham = 124 ± 65.9 days, active = 115 ± 69.8 days, difference: 9 days, 95% confidence interval (CI) = Poisson model: 0.578-3.547]. Moreover, HF-rTMS did not affect craving (AUQ/OCDS) (sham = 15.38/5.28, active = 17.48/4.75, differences = 2.1/-0.53, 95% CI mixed-effects model = -9.14 to 2.07/-1.44 to 2.40). CONCLUSIONS: There was no clear evidence that high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation over the right dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex treatment has a long-term positive effect on alcohol use or craving as add-on treatment for alcohol use disorder. High treatment response at 6-month follow-up could have limited the possibility to find an effect.

The role of attention in decision-making under risk in gambling disorder: An eye-tracking study.

Gambling disorder (GD) is a behavioural addiction characterized by impairments in decision-making, favouring risk- and reward-prone choices. One explanatory factor for this behaviour is a deviation in attentional processes, as increasing evidence indicates that GD patients show an attentional bias toward gambling stimuli. However, previous attentional studies have not directly investigated attention during risky decision-making. 26 patients with GD and 29 healthy matched controls (HC) completed a mixed gambles task combined with eye-tracking to investigate attentional biases for potential gains versus losses during decision-making under risk. Results indicate that compared to HC, GD patients gambled more and were less loss averse. GD patients did not show a direct attentional bias towards gains (or relative to losses). Using a recent (neuro)economics model that considers average attention and trial-wise deviations in average attention, we conducted fine-grained exploratory analyses of the attentional data. Results indicate that the average attention for gains in GD patients moderated the effect of gain value on gambling choices, whereas this was not the case for HC. GD patients with high average attention for gains started gambling at less high gain values. A similar trend-level effect was found for losses, where GD patients with high average attention for losses stopped gambling at lower loss values. This study gives more insight into how attentional processes in GD play a role in gambling behaviour, which could have implications for the development of future treatments focusing on attentional training or for the development of interventions that increase the salience of losses.

Metacognition and the effect of incentive motivation in two compulsive disorders: Gambling disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder.

AIMS: Compulsivity is a common phenotype among psychiatric disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and gambling disorder (GD). Deficiencies in metacognition, such as the inability to estimate one's performance via confidence judgments could contribute to pathological decision-making. Earlier research has shown that patients with OCD exhibit underconfidence, while patients with GD exhibit overconfidence. Moreover, it is known that motivational states (e.g. monetary incentives) influence metacognition, with gain (respectively loss) prospects increasing (respectively decreasing) confidence. Here, we reasoned that OCD and GD symptoms might correspond to an exacerbation of this interaction between metacognition and motivation. METHODS: We hypothesized GD's overconfidence to be exaggerated during gain prospects, while OCD's underconfidence to be worsened in loss context, which we expected to see represented in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) blood-oxygen-level-dependent activity. We tested those hypotheses in a task-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) design (27 patients with GD, 28 patients with OCD, 55 controls). The trial is registered in the Dutch Trial Register (NL6171). RESULTS: We showed increased confidence for patients with GD versus patients with OCD, which could partly be explained by sex and IQ. Although our primary analyses did not support the hypothesized interaction between incentives and groups, exploratory analyses did show increased confidence in patients with GD specifically in gain context. fMRI analyses confirmed a central role for VMPFC in the processing of confidence and incentives, but no differences between the groups. CONCLUSION: Patients with OCD and those with GD reside at opposite ends of the confidence spectrum, while no interaction with incentives was found, nor group differences in neuronal processing of confidence.

Motivational signals disrupt metacognitive signals in the human ventromedial prefrontal cortex.

A growing body of evidence suggests that, during decision-making, BOLD signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) correlates both with motivational variables - such as incentives and expected values - and metacognitive variables - such as confidence judgments - which reflect the subjective probability of being correct. At the behavioral level, we recently demonstrated that the value of monetary stakes bias confidence judgments, with gain (respectively loss) prospects increasing (respectively decreasing) confidence judgments, even for similar levels of difficulty and performance. If and how this value-confidence interaction is reflected in the VMPFC remains unknown. Here, we used an incentivized perceptual decision-making fMRI task that dissociates key decision-making variables, thereby allowing to test several hypotheses about the role of the VMPFC in the value-confidence interaction. While our initial analyses seemingly indicate that the VMPFC combines incentives and confidence to form an expected value signal, we falsified this conclusion with a meticulous dissection of qualitative activation patterns. Rather, our results show that strong VMPFC confidence signals observed in trials with gain prospects are disrupted in trials with no - or negative (loss) - monetary prospects. Deciphering how decision variables are represented and interact at finer scales seems necessary to better understand biased (meta)cognition.

Abnormalities of confidence in psychiatry: an overview and future perspectives.

Our behavior is constantly accompanied by a sense of confidence and its' precision is critical for adequate adaptation and survival. Importantly, abnormal confidence judgments that do not reflect reality may play a crucial role in pathological decision-making typically seen in psychiatric disorders. In this review, we propose abnormalities of confidence as a new model of interpreting psychiatric symptoms. We hypothesize a dysfunction of confidence at the root of psychiatric symptoms either expressed subclinically in the general population or clinically in the patient population. Our review reveals a robust association between confidence abnormalities and psychiatric symptomatology. Confidence abnormalities are present in subclinical/prodromal phases of psychiatric disorders, show a positive relationship with symptom severity, and appear to normalize after recovery. In the reviewed literature, the strongest evidence was found for a decline in confidence in (sub)clinical OCD, and for a decrease in confidence discrimination in (sub)clinical schizophrenia. We found suggestive evidence for increased/decreased confidence in addiction and depression/anxiety, respectively. Confidence abnormalities may help to understand underlying psychopathological substrates across disorders, and should thus be considered transdiagnostically. This review provides clear evidence for confidence abnormalities in different psychiatric disorders, identifies current knowledge gaps and supplies suggestions for future avenues. As such, it may guide future translational research into the underlying processes governing these abnormalities, as well as future interventions to restore them.